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Abstract	
	
This	article	is	an	essay	based	on	many	years	of	reviewing	journal	submissions	
and	discussions	with	business	ethics	scholars	on	a	range	of	themes	regarding	
methods.	To	some	extent,	it	contains	condensed	thoughts	from	two	experienced	
scholars	in	the	field,	which	we	hope	will	be	useful,	especially	to	emerging	
scholars	who,	to	some	extent,	may	be	still	wrestling	with	some	of	the	issues	
raised	in	the	article.	
	
The	validity	and	reliability	of	research	methods	in	business	ethics	research	is	
discussed	in	terms	of	legitimate	methods	to	employ	in	the	discipline,	the	
epistemic	challenges	in	the	discipline,	the	debate	between	qualitative	and	
quantitative	methods,	and	some	considered	comments	on	‘researching	well’	in	
this	discipline.	Within	each	theme,	we	attempt	to	convey	our	distilled	thoughts	in	
the	hope	that	methods	employed	in	future	studies	will	avoid	some	of	the	failures	
we	have	observed	in	the	past.	
	
Introduction	
	
One	of	the	characteristics	of	research	in	business	ethics	is	that	it	attracts	
contributions	from	a	wide	range	of	professional	and	academic	backgrounds.	This	
is	both	a	strength,	in	that	the	discussions	taking	place	are	wide‐ranging	and	
multi‐vocal,	and	also	a	challenge	in	that	there	has	been	little	convergence	on	a	
canon	of	accepted	research	methods	in	the	business	ethics	academy.	The	lack	of	
perceived	‘entry	barriers’	to	the	field	leads	many	to	believe	their	position,	
background,	beliefs	or	expertise	qualify	them	to	make	a	contribution,	and	this	
has	led	to	a	wide	diversity	of	approaches,	some	of	which	are	more	helpful	and	
rigorous	than	others.	
	
The	range	of	methods	employed	varies	from	reflective	pieces	employing	aspects	
of	philosophy,	theology	or	belief,	to	strongly	positivist	pieces	seeking	
correlations	between	variables	and	the	like.	There	has	been	less	agreement	that	
certain	methods	are	more	suited	to	research	questions	in	business	ethics	
research	than	others,	and	perhaps	it	is	ambitious	to	suggest	that	such	any	such	
convergence	is	ever	likely	to	materialise.	It	may	not	even	be	desirable.	
	
This	paper	is	intended	to	be	an	overview	and	discussion	of	some	of	the	
prominent	issues,	as	we	see	them,	in	considering	research	methods	in	empirical	
business	ethics	research.	The	perceived	need	for	this	paper	is	partly	in	response	
to	many	years	of	reading	and	reviewing	research	in	the	area,	which,	whilst	often	
well‐conceived	in	terms	of	research	question,	is	sometimes	suboptimal	in	terms	
of	methods	employed.	Put	another	way,	we	believe	that	business	ethics	has,	or	
should	have,	an	important	research	agenda	–	the	ethics	of	business	matter	–	and	
that	agenda	needs	to	be	addressed	with	appropriate	academic	standards	and	
rigour.	
	
The	problems	occasioned	by	suboptimal	method	employment	are	concerned	
with	the	ability	of	an	otherwise	cogent	research	project	to	provide	reliable,	valid	
or	trustworthy	findings.	The	issues	of	reliability,	validity	or	trustworthiness	are	
key	to	questions	of	method	selection	in	any	field,	but	in	an	emergent	field	such	as	
business	ethics,	with	so	many	influences	and	academic	approaches,	these	are	
sometimes	cast	into	sharp	focus	by	apparent	difficulties	in	meeting	those	
challenges.	To	varying	extents,	all	social	sciences	must	wrestle	with	
epistemological	challenges,	since	the	method	must	be	capable	of	reliably	
answering	the	research	question	posed	and	of	delivering	valid	conclusions.	Some	
otherwise	worthy	research	projects,	perhaps	conducted	by	scholars	less	familiar	
with	epistemological	conundrums,	fail	to	do	so	and	it	is	partly	to	address	this	
challenge	that	this	paper	is	offered.	
	
The	remainder	of	the	paper	considers,	first,	whether	it	is	possible	to	converge	on	
a	set	of	methods	suitable	for	research	in	the	field	of	business	ethics	and	whether	
this	is	even	desirable.	Second,	we	comment	on	the	debate	between	quantitative,	
qualitative	and	‘mixed’	methods	research.	Third,	the	quality	of	empirical	
research	in	business	ethics	is	discussed.	The	conclusion	draws	together	the	key	
points	of	our	arguments.	
	
Legitimate	methods	in	business	ethics	research	
	
Among	the	range	of	journals	in	which	business	ethics	research	is	published,	
there	is	an	approximately	agreed	hierarchy,	even	if	details	are	contested.	Some	of	
the	articles	most	highly	cited	by	scholars,	and	arguably	some	of	the	most	
rigorous	in	terms	of	quality,	are	published	in	journals	outwith	the	main	business	
ethics	journals	themselves.	Specifically,	work	in	the	highly	respected	American	
Academy	journals	(Academy	of	Management	Journal	and	Academy	of	
Management	Review)	have	often	been	highly	influential,	as	has	work	in	more	
general	management	and	strategy‐type	journals	(such	as	Strategic	Management	
Journal).	What	these	journals	share	is	that	they	are	American,	and	with	this	
nationality	comes	a	pedigree	of	method	traditionally	associated	with	the	
empirical	and,	indeed,	the	positivist,	at	least	in	the	case	of	research	conducted	in	
business	schools.	
	
Aspiring	scholars	are	perhaps	influenced	by	this	tradition,	and	because	work	in	
these	journals	is	sometimes	considered	elite,	emulation	of	the	methods	is	
common,	even	when	the	research	questions	posed	do	not	necessarily	‘match’	the	
method	selected.	Scholars	influenced	by	this	approach	often	see	method	as	a	
means	of	determining	a	‘truth’	in	the	rationalist	sense	of	the	term.	This	means	
that	there	is	an	assumption	that	a	‘truth’	is	tractable	and	accessible,	if	only	a	
method	can	be	employed	capable	of	accessing	that	truth.	A	selection	is	then	
made	from	a	constrained	set	of	permitted	or	admired	methods.	
	
We	use	the	term	‘legitimate’	in	the	title	of	this	section	advisedly.	Each	method	
has	some	legitimacy	and	effectiveness	in	a	particular	context	and	epistemic	
milieu,	but	when	methods	are	borrowed	from	one	literature	and	applied	to	
another	with	insufficient	scrutiny	of	their	suitability,	then	an	otherwise	
legitimate	method	(in	one	context)	can	become	less	than	legitimate	in	another.	
	
Other	traditions	have	also	been	brought	to	bear	on	ethics	questions,	however.	
Scholars	trained	in	the	social	sciences	or	in	the	humanities	may	not	necessarily	
be	‘truth	seekers’	in	the	positivist	employment	of	the	term.	Perhaps	more	
‘explorers’	than	‘truth	seekers’,	their	desire	to	reflect	and	‘understand’	may	
supplant	the	need	to	‘know’.	This	approach	precipitates	a	completely	different	
approach	to	method.	Such	‘explorers’	are	more	likely	to	employ	methods	seeking	
to	gain	verstehen	rather	than	to	provide	a	finding	that	possesses	a	certain	level	of	
statistical	significance.	
	
Of	course,	the	spectrum	of	sociological	(and	social	science)	paradigms	is	well	
understood	(Burrell	&	Morgan	1979)	and	it	is	not	our	intention	to	repeat	those	
insights	and	supporting	arguments	here.	Rather,	we	suggest	that	method	
employed	must,	to	be	valid,	reflect	the	paradigm	or	tradition	the	researcher	is	
immersed	in.	This	is	probably	uncontroversial,	but	our	experience	suggests	that	
it	bears	repeating.	Moreover,	the	research	method	must	be	appropriate	to	the	
research	question,	which	itself	tends	to	be	embedded	within	a	certain	paradigm	
–	or	at	least	may	be	incommensurate	with	some	paradigms.	Perhaps	this	is	less	
often	recognised.	
	
So	is	there	an	accepted	canon	of	methods	appropriate	to	the	range	of	challenges	
encountered	in	business	ethics	research?	Given	the	eclecticism	of	the	range	of	
research	questions	posed	in	a	wide‐ranging,	ultimately	applied	field	such	as	
business	ethics	research,	we	would	resist	such	a	suggestion,	but	strongly	
reinforce	the	notion	that	whilst	some	research	questions	are	more	worthwhile	
than	others,	each	question	necessitates	careful	method	selection.	Again,	in	
abstract	this	assertion	might	seem	uncontroversial,	but	it	runs	up	against	certain	
positions	in	social	science	that	appear	to	be	significant	and,	at	times,	almost	
‘tribal’	in	nature.	
	
Quantitative,	qualitative	or	‘mixed’	methods	
	
The	debate	between	qualitative	and	quantitative	method	subsists	in	many	fields	
of	social	science	research.	The	dominance	of	the	American	positivist	model	for	
‘respectable’	social	science	research	(Cowton	1998),	especially	those	careerist	
business	school	colleagues	who	want	to	impress	American	journal	editors	and	
reviewers,	means	that	positivist	approaches	still	dominate	in	many	sub‐genres	of	
ethics	research.	A	cursory	glance	at	most	of	the	major	journals	in	the	field	will	
show	tables	of	numbers,	graphs,	scatterplots,	‘rankings’	of	various	metrics	and	
the	like.	Some	of	this	work	has	been	contributed	by	the	current	authors	
themselves.	
	
However,	it	is	a	curious	feature	of	an	academic	field	such	as	business	ethics	–	
essentially	concerned	with	the	moral	values	in	which	business	activity	takes	
place	–	that	authors	seek	to	use	a	quantitative	toolkit	as	their	primary	weapon.	
The	1990s	witnessed	a	series	of	papers	that	sought	to	concern	themselves	with	
empirical	research	in	business	ethics	(e.g.	Cowton	1998,	Frederick	1992,	
Robertson	1993,	Weber	1992).	One	salient	point	from	the	discussions	at	that	
time,	and	since,	is	that	the	quest	to	position	business	ethics	research	as	a	serious	
academic	area	of	enquiry,	necessitated,	in	some	people’s	minds,	a	robust	method	
toolkit.	And	because	in	other	fields	of	social	science,	quantitative	methods	are	de	
rigueur,	some	authors	may	have	made	a	similar	questionable	assumption	in	
business	ethics	research:	it	has	to	be	quantitative	to	be	robust	and	legitimate.	
	
This,	of	course,	is	a	simplistic	and	reductionist	view,	as	we	make	clear	in	the	
section	above	on	method	matching	paradigm.	It	seems	self‐evident	that	all	of	the	
large,	strategic	and	substantial	questions	in	life	are	essentially	qualitative.	This	is	
not	to	say	that	quantitative	methods	are	redundant	–	far	from	it.	But	it	is	to	say	
that	quantitative	methods	are	useful	only	if	a	simple	truth	is	tractable	given	the	
outcome	of	the	quantitative	enquiry.	It	is	more	likely	that	truth	is	intractable	in	
that	way	or	that	the	variables	employed	in	the	method	are	not	as	
epistemologically	‘hard’	as	the	method	assumes	them	to	be.	A	statistical	test	
implicitly	assumes	that	the	numbers	being	processed	represent	meaningfully	
what	they	claim	to	represent.	In	many	cases,	the	variables	involved	are	
themselves	proxies,	and	often	soft	proxies	at	that.	It	is	ironic	that	exclusively	–	or,	
rather,	exclusivist	–	quantitative	researchers	bring	to	their	work	a	set	of	values	
and	commitments,	about	what	is	important	to	research	and	how	to	research	it,	
which	are	essentially	qualitative	in	nature	while	they	advocate	a	supposedly	
value‐free,	neutral	position.	
	
So	if	the	big	questions	in	ethics	are	essentially	qualitative	(such	as	questions	of	
right,	justice,	fairness,	decency,	equality,	etc.),	why	is	it	so	often	believed	that	
quantitative	variables	are	capable	of	describing	them,	frequently	with	limited	
apparent	reflection	and	negligible	caveats?	Even	if	truth	is	tractable	with	a	
quantitative	method,	such	an	approach	would	only	be	capable	of	answering	a	
limited	number	of	questions	and	only	those	‘put	to’	the	method.	When	seen	in	
the	context	of	the	larger	questions	in	ethics,	the	applicability	of	most	quantitative	
methods	is	limited.	Why	is	it	of	interest,	for	example,	if	two	particular	variables	
are	correlated?	This,	even	if	demonstrated,	would	be	a	phenomenon	of	meaning	
only	within	a	certain	social	and	ethical	framework.	Put	bluntly,	using	a	
prominent	example	from	the	business	ethics	literature:	if	ethics	doesn’t	pay,	so	
what?	
	
It	has	become	increasingly	common,	in	addressing	these	constraints,	to	use	
elements	of	a	range	of	approaches	in	research	methods:	the	so	called	‘mixed	
method’	approach.	Partly	driven	by	the	structures	of	PhD	projects	and	arising	in	
part	from	those,	mixed	methods	papers	are	often	more	intelligent	in	their	
approaches	that	those	employing	a	single	method.	Essentially,	an	author	can	
derive	a	research	question	of	meaning	and	then	ask,	‘what	is	the	best	way	to	
answer	this	research	question?’	It	is	often	the	case	that	some	qualitative	methods	
and	some	elements	of	quantitative	techniques	can	be	brought	to	bear	on	a	
research	problem.	A	typical	approach	in	this	tradition	might	be	a	mix	of	
interviews	in	which	attitudes	and	beliefs	are	examined,	supported	by	a	range	of	
Likert	scale	type	responses,	enabling	some	of	the	interviewees’,	or	others’,	
responses	to	be	analysed	numerically.	
	
In	conclusion,	business	ethics	matters,	but	we	have	a	concern	that	business	
ethics	research	doesn’t	matter	as	much	as	it	should	because	the	range	and	
balance	of	research	methods	being	employed	are	not	what	they	could	or	should	
be.	In	particular,	we	are	concerned	that	the	research	questions	and	research	
agenda	(Cowton	2008)	are	being	unduly	influenced	by	choice	of	research	
method,	whereas	the	principal	influence	should	be	in	the	opposite	direction.	
Some	of	this	seems	to	reflect	a	desire	to	acquire	academic	respectability.	
However,	such	respectability	–	and	anything	of	substance	that	a	particular	piece	
of	research	has	to	offer	–	depends	upon	not	just	the	choice	of	method	but	how	
well	it	is	carried	out.	We	offer	some	thoughts	on	this	issue	in	the	next	section.	
	
On	researching	well	
	
Assuming	that	a	particular	research	method	is	legitimate	for	answering	a	
question	that	matters,	it	needs	to	be	carried	out	competently	in	order	for	the	
outcome	to	be	of	value.	However,	as	mentioned	earlier,	the	1990s	saw	a	series	of	
papers	that	'worried'	about	empirical	research	in	business	ethics.	Some	of	these	
papers	discussed	the	relationship	between	normative	and	empirical	methods	
(e.g.	Donaldson	1994,	Weaver	and	Trevino	1994),	an	issue	familiar	from	ethics	
more	generally,	principally	in	the	form	of	Hume’s	Law	or	Guillotine	(Donaldson	
1994)	that	it	is	impossible	to	derive	an	ought	directly	from	an	is	(Hudson	1969).	
However,	many	of	the	concerns	were	rather	more	pragmatic;	the	quality	of	
empirical	research	in	business	ethics	was	called	into	question,	either	because	it	
was	thought	that	business	ethics	researchers	were	not	employing	research	
methods	as	well	as	they	might	or	because	of	the	particular	challenges	of	
conducting	empirical	research	into	sensitive	ethical	matters.	In	this	section	we	
discuss	our	own	impressions	of	the	current	state	of	affairs	and	provide	what	we	
hope	will	be	some	helpful	suggestions	for	empirical	researchers	in	the	field.	
	
The	fact	that	business	ethics	deals	with	sensitive	issues,	or	should	seek	to	do	so,	
sets	up	particular	challenges	when	it	comes	to	obtaining	good	quality	data.	The	
first	challenge	is	simply	to	get	any	data	at	all.	For	example,	if	seeking	to	conduct	
an	interview‐based	study,	individuals	and,	in	particular,	those	who	employ	them,	
tend	to	be	very	reluctant	to	provide	access.	With	the	increase	in	profile	of	
scandals	and	business	ethics	more	generally,	this	is	unlikely	to	have	become	any	
easier	in	recent	years.	In	other	words,	the	perceived	importance	of	business	
ethics	would	be	expected	to	reduce	the	likelihood	of	being	able	to	obtain	good	
data	–	all	the	more	so	for	high‐profile	and	important	or	sensitive	topics.	Similar	
factors	would	be	expected	to	be	in	play	in	the	case	of	questionnaire	surveys	also,	
against	a	background	of	increasing	difficulty	in	obtaining	satisfactory	response	
rates	in	social	research	generally.	
	
Where	data	has	been	collected,	there	remains	the	risk	–	and	indeed	the	suspicion	
–	that	the	responses	are	not	accurate	reflections	of	what	the	researcher	is	
researching.	The	issue	of	social	desirability	response	bias	–	which	Randall	and	
Fernandes	(1991:	805)	defined	as,	“the	tendency	of	individuals	to	deny	socially	
undesirable	traits	and	behaviors	and	to	admit	to	socially	desirable	one,”	was	
raised	in	business	ethics	research	in	the	1990s	(Randall	and	Fernandes	1991,	
Fernandes	and	Randall	1992).	There	are	means	of	encouraging	candour	in	
research	subjects’	responses.	For	example,	assurances	of	confidentiality	and	
anonymity	are	often	mentioned	by	authors	in	reports	of	their	research.	
Randomised	research	techniques	have	also	been	advocated	(Dalton	and	Metzger	
1992,	Dalton	et	al.	1996),	though	we	do	not	think	these	have	been	used	widely	in	
business	ethics	research.	We	believe	that	the	methodological	discussions	in	
business	ethics	research	would	be	improved	by	further	engagement	with	the	
issue	of	social	desirability	response	bias,	not	only	to	reassure	the	reader	of	a	
particular	piece	of	research	but	also	to	provide	examples	for	future	researchers.	
Moreover,	we	are	disappointed	that	not	more	studies	relying	upon	questionnaire	
surveys	appear	to	use	scales	that	can	help	detect	social	desirability	response	
bias,	whether	resulting	from	self‐deception	or	from	impression	management.	It	
would	be	desirable	for	journal	referees	and	editors	to	be	more	assiduous	in	
asking	about	the	use	of	such	techniques.	Given	that	this	suggestion	is	based	only	
on	our	impression	of	published	and	unpublished	work	to	which	we	have	had	
access	as	researchers	and	as	reviewers,	it	would	make	sense	for	a	systematic	
review	of	such	matters	to	be	undertaken.	We	would	also	be	interested	to	see	the	
extent	to	which	non‐response	bias	is	considered	in	business	ethics	research	
papers.	Again,	our	impression	is	that	it	is	a	far	from	universal	practice.	
	
Of	course,	much	business	ethics	research	has	as	an	underlying	aim,	albeit	
perhaps	a	very	distant	one,	which	is	a	desire	to	improve	business	practice	in	
ethical	terms.	However,	for	reasons	of	access	it	is	very	difficult	to	observe	
behaviour	with	regard	to	ethical	issues	on	the	systematic	basis	necessary	for	
research;	and	the	problem	of	social	desirability	response	bias,	coupled	with	
reluctance	to	participate	if	pressed	on	sensitive	issues,	means	that	asking	about	a	
person's	actual	behaviour	might	be	likely	to	be	unproductive	in	many	
circumstances.	For	this	reason,	many	researchers	prefer	to	address	the	issue	of	
behaviour	(or	at	least	attitudes	or	judgements	etc.)	through	the	vehicle	of	
scenarios.		
	
Scenarios	can	be	very	useful,	but	it	is	important	that	they	are	appropriate.	One	
pertinent	question	has	always	been	whether	the	scenarios	drawn	upon	are	
particularly	relevant	to	business	ethics.	Moreover,	while	it	is	good	to	use	
scenarios	that	appear	to	have	been	well	validated	by	previous	research	(which	
also	provides	opportunities	for	comparability),	it	has	to	be	asked	whether	they	
continue	to	be	relevant	to	business	ethics	today.	There	is	a	potential	tension	
between	established	validity	and	contemporary	relevance,	therefore.	Moreover,	
with	research	being	increasingly	conducted	internationally,	it	is	important	to	
check	the	appropriateness	of	scenarios	to	a	particular	cultural	context.	This	is	
not	just	a	question	of	changing	the	names	of	characters	or	organisations;	it	is	also	
a	question	of	adjusting	the	institutional	context	and	assumptions	in	a	given	
scenario.	For	example,	in	a	country	with	free	healthcare	available,	it	would	make	
little	sense	to	use	a	scenario	in	which	an	employee	is	tempted	to	act	unethically	
because	a	member	of	their	family	requires	urgent	and	expensive	medical	
treatment;	but	it	might	make	sense	to	replace	that	with	some	other	pressing	
family	need.	Thus	our	recommendation	is	that	researchers	do	not	simply	adopt	
scenarios	that	have	been	used	in	previous	studies,	but	that	they	consider	
whether	the	scenarios	need	to	be	adapted	for	the	context	in	which	the	research	
is	taking	place.	Similar	points	would	apply	to	questions	and	measurement	scales	
used	in	questionnaire	surveys.	Our	impression	is	that	there	is	a	growing	stock	of	
suitable	research	instruments	available	to	business	ethics	researchers,	but	
intelligent	application	is	required.	
	
So	far	we	have	been	assuming	that	the	research	subjects	(interviewees	or	survey	
respondents)	are	qualified	to	provide	appropriate	research	material.	However,	
the	challenges	of	obtaining	data	have	meant	that	many	researchers	have	been	
pushed	towards	using	convenience	samples.	This	is	often	seen	as	problematic;	
indeed,	it	is	almost	a	pejorative	term.	However,	some	convenience	samples	can	
be	very	useful;	the	research	subjects	are	appropriate,	but	the	sample	does	not	
match	up	to	the	tenets	of	randomised	sampling	found	in	the	research	methods	
textbooks.	Sometimes	this	is	because	it	is	difficult	to	obtain	such	a	sample;	and	
sometimes	it	is	difficult	to	know	enough	about	the	nature	of	the	population	to	
even	design,	let	alone	obtain,	a	randomised	sample.	The	degree	to	which	the	
realised	sample	provides	insights	of	value	will	be	a	matter	of	judgement,	but	in	a	
field	such	as	business	ethics	so	much	still	remains	to	be	researched	and	
discovered,	we	are	not	over‐concerned	with	this	matter	–	as	long	as	researchers	
provide	a	descriptive	account	of,	and	suitable	reflection	on,	what	they	have	done.		
	
A	greater	concern	is	where	students	are	used	as	a	convenience	sample.	Of	
course,	in	the	case	of	business	ethics	education	research,	students	are	highly	
appropriate	research	subjects	–	though	we	do	note	that	many	past	studies	have	
focused	on	only	one	institution	(usually	where	the	author	teaches	–	very	
convenient!),	which	generally	makes	the	study	of	very	limited	value.	Our	main	
worry	is	where	students	are	used	as	proxies	for	practising	managers	etc.	Our	
sense	is	that	fewer	studies	of	this	kind	are	now	being	conducted,	or	at	least	they	
are	much	less	likely	to	be	published	in	reputable	journals	nowadays.	However,	
where	they	do	take	place	there	should	be	deeper	reflection	on	what	the	sample	
can	and	cannot	provide	insights	into,	rather	than	the	rather	short	defensive	
justification	that	is	sometimes	given.	
	
In	the	case	of	quantitative	research,	which,	as	we	have	already	mentioned,	tends	
to	dominate	the	empirical	research	in	business	ethics,	there	are	not	only	issues	
with	regard	to	data	collection	but	also	regarding	data	analysis.	These	issues	are	
not	peculiar	to	business	ethics;	once	the	data	has	been	collected,	the	issues	
around	analysis	are	somewhat	similar	in	any	social	research.	Whether	or	not	
business	ethicists	are	at	the	forefront	of	the	analysis	of	empirical	data,	our	
impression	is	that	it	has	become	much	more	sophisticated	in	recent	years.	There	
are	likely	to	be	several	reasons	for	this,	including	the	training	that	is	available	in	
doctoral	programs	and	elsewhere	and	the	widespread	availability	of	statistical	
software	packages	–	though	the	latter	without	the	former	is	likely	to	be	
problematic.	Of	course,	the	statistical	method	chosen	has	to	be	both	appropriate	
and	applied	correctly.	However,	our	major	concern	is	with	what	takes	place	
either	side	of	the	data	collection	and	analysis	process.	
	
First,	we	find	that	many	of	the	papers	that	we	review	for	journals	have	poor	
motivation	and,	especially,	weak	development	of	hypotheses.	It	is	almost	as	if	the	
literature	review	is	something	to	be	got	out	of	the	way	before	the	authors	come	
up	with	some	hypotheses	that,	they	believe,	fit	with	the	data	that	they	have	
access	to.	Sometimes	the	literature	review	is,	on	the	surface,	perfectly	competent	
but	then	the	hypotheses	seem	to	appear,	unmotivated,	out	of	nowhere.	Our	
position	is	that	hypotheses	and/or	research	questions	need	to	be	developed,	not	
just	stated.	Moreover,	we	find	that	many	hypotheses	would	benefit	from	closer	
scrutiny	of	their	wording.	Not	only	should	they	be	parsimonious,	but	there	
should	be	no	doubt	about	what	they	mean.	This	is,	sadly,	far	from	the	case	in	
many	papers	we	see.	
	
Second,	once	the	findings	of	the	research	have	been	presented	and	the	
hypotheses	(if	present	in	the	paper)	have	been	tested,	the	connection	back	to	
literature	is	often	poorly	done.	To	secure	a	worthwhile	contribution,	the	
implications	of	the	findings	should	be	fully	considered,	which	requires	a	return	
to,	and	proper	reflection	upon,	the	literature.	In	other	words,	findings	should	be	
discussed,	not	just	presented.	This	includes,	early	in	the	exposition,	interpreting	
tables	and	not	just	repeating	their	content	inefficiently	in	the	text.	Authors	
should	seek	to	draw	out	the	key	points.	This	is	not	just	a	question	of	inserting	
asterisks	to	indicate	statistical	significance.	With	the	key	points	of	the	research	
established,	the	implications	for	the	relevant	body	of	literature	can	be	developed.	
	
Too	often,	though,	the	discussion	is	perfunctory	(it	is	a	good	discipline	to	commit	
to	a	discussion	section	towards	the	end	of	a	paper).	A	common	approach	is	to	
note	in	the	literature	review	that	previous	research	results	have	been	‘mixed’;	
for	example,	some	studies	might	have	shown	that	older	workers	have	a	
particular	attitude	whereas	other	studies	did	not	find	this.	The	authors	of	the	
latest	research	then	say	which	set	of	papers,	cited	in	the	literature	review,	their	
own	research	matches.	This	adds	to	the	literature,	to	the	body	of	empirical	
findings,	but	that	body	of	findings	remains	‘mixed’.	Of	course,	this	outcome	was	
inevitable	from	the	outset.	Very	little	progress	appears	to	have	been	made	or,	
indeed,	to	have	been	possible.	However,	the	latest	findings	will	often	provide	an	
opportunity	for	the	researcher	to	ponder	what	might	be	going	on.	What	might	
account	for	the	different	results	to	date?	Are	there	are	any	features	that	the	
current	research	has	served	to	highlight	that	might	provide	a	resolution	or,	at	
least,	suggestions	for	further	research?	This	kind	of	insight	cannot	be	supplied	by	
statistical	packages	but	requires	understanding	and	insight,	not	to	say	a	little	
creativity	on	occasions,	on	the	part	of	authors.	
	
These	critical	comments	play	into	earlier	worries	relating	to	the	role	of	theory	in	
empirical	research	in	business	ethics	(e.g.	Randall	and	Gibson	1990,	Robertson	
1993).	Sometimes	those	worries	seem	to	have	been	motivated	by	a	commitment	
to	a	positivistic,	hypothetico‐deductive	pattern	for	research.	While	we	do	not	
necessarily	object	to	such	research,	we	believe	that	a	proper	conception	of	
theory	and	theory’s	role	is	much	richer	than	this.	Indeed,	we	are	not	necessarily	
against	a	certain	degree	of	descriptive	research,	where	theory	is	absent	(or	
barely	present),	especially	where	little	is	known	about	a	subject.	Because	of	our	
views	of	what	social	science	can	or	cannot	be	expected	to	do	–	for	example,	we	
are	sceptical	of	attempts	to	provide	powerful	causal	accounts	of	ethical	
behaviour	–	we	are	more	inclined	to	a	position	which	advocates	that	research	
takes	full	account	of	what	has	been	done	before	and	reflectively	uses	conceptual	
apparatus	appropriate	to	its	task.	
	
Of	course,	qualitative	research	tends	to	have	a	different	relationship	with	theory,	
particularly	when	undertaken	in	a	more	inductive	manner.	We	would	hope	to	
see	more	qualitative	research	in	business	ethics	in	the	future.	Part	of	the	
challenge	is	gaining	good	access,	but	equally	important	is	the	need	to	ensure	that	
data	collection	and	analysis	are	undertaken	with	rigour	appropriate	to	the	
research	tradition.	Only	then	will	findings	that	seem	interesting	on	the	surface	
also	be	regarded	as	trustworthy	and	reliable	(see	the	paper	on	focus	groups	by	
Cowton	&	Downs	in	this	issue).	We	would	also	like	to	see	more	case	study	
research,	even	single	cases.	Positivism	sometimes	casts	an	unhelpful	shadow	
over	the	generation	and	use	of	case	studies	for	research,	because	they	are	
believed	not	to	be	generalizable.	However,	this	is	population	generalisation;	
many	other	insights	of	value	external	to	a	case	study	can	be	generated,	
depending	on	the	depth	and	quality	of	the	data	and	the	way	in	which	the	case	is	
related	to	the	existing	literature.	
	
Conclusion	
	
The	purpose	of	this	essay	has	been	to	reflect	upon	and	discuss	some	of	the	
pressing	issues	to	have	emerged	from	our	experience	of	many	years	of	reviewing	
journal	submissions	and	sitting	through	business	ethics	presentations	at	
conferences	and	the	like.	
	
We	maintain	that	business	ethics	research	remains	an	important	discipline	in	the	
broader	corpus	of	business	research,	and	in	pursuit	of	excellence	in	that	
discipline,	scholars	must	be	cognisant	of	the	range	of	issues	discussed	in	this	
article.	We	are	generally	not	supportive	of	the	default	posture	to	reach	for	a	
positivist	method	in	ethics	studies,	believing	that	more	carefully	and	insightfully	
designed	methods	will	be	more	powerful	and	much	more	insightful	–	which	is	
not	to	say	that	quantitative	studies	do	not	have	their	place.	
	
This	paper	is	intended	to	be	a	means	of	discussing	these	issues	but	also	to	
provide	an	extended	introduction	to	this	special	edition	of	Business	Ethics:	A	
European	Review.	It	is	our	hope	that	the	academy	finds	both	this	introductory	
issue	and	the	other	papers	in	this	issue	of	value.	
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